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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-1388

MARGARET H. CRAWFORD; WILLIAM CRAWFORD; JAMES F. MURPHY,
Appellants
v.
JEFFREY MILLER; STEPHEN KREMPASKY; JAMES BOCK;
CHARLES STASKIEWICZ; ROBERT ERDELY; KIRBY CROFT

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-00214)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 14, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2008)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Appellants Margaret Crawford, William Crawford, and James Murphy appeal pro
se from the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants

James Bock, Kirby Croft, Robert Erdely, Jeffrey Miller, and Charles Staskiewicz.1 This
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arose in large part out of an investigation by the
Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) into the alleged unauthorized sale of state police
property on the internet and the actions taken by PSP officers during and after their
investigation. We need not repeat the details of appellants’ claims here as they are wellknown to the parties and are summarized in the District Court’s memorandum. For the
following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over a district court’s order of summary judgment. See Kaucher v.
County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Id. at 422-423. An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a
factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law. Id. at 423 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In
conducting our review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Id.
On appeal, Margaret Crawford contends that the District Court erred in concluding
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Appellants were represented by counsel before the District Court, but are appealing
pro se. Plaintiff Larhonda Batzel is not participating in this appeal.
2

that her malicious prosecution claim against defendants Croft and Staskiewicz was timebarred. The applicable statute of limitations for Margaret Crawford’s § 1983 claim is that
governing personal injury claims in Pennsylvania. See Wallace v. Kato, --- U.S. ----, 127
S.Ct. 1091, 1094, (2007); see also Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d
451, 457 n. 9 (3d Cir.1996). Therefore, Margaret Crawford had two years from the time
her cause of action accrued in which to file her complaint. See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 457 n.
9. The statute of limitations on malicious prosecution claims “does not begin to run until
the underlying criminal proceedings are terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Rose v. Bartle,
871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989).
We agree with the District Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact to
challenge a conclusion that the charges against Margaret Crawford were dismissed on
January 28, 2003. Accordingly, Margaret Crawford was required to file her complaint no
later than January 28, 2005, but failed to do so until February 1, 2005. Accordingly, the
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Croft and
Staskiewicz.
Summary judgment was also properly granted in favor of defendant Erdely with
respect to William Crawford’s claim that Erdely deprived him of his property (his
personal computer) by damaging it and retaining it “for no just or proper reason without
due process of law.” Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Erdely
because, as explained by the District Court, William Crawford’s response to Erdely’s
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motion for summary judgment provided no record support for his position that the
computer had been damaged or improperly retained. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (nonmoving party may not rest on allegations in the complaint but
must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.”) (quotation omitted). See also Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v.
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or
shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with
facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal
memoranda, or oral argument.”)
Appellant Murphy’s challenge to the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant Bock is likewise without merit. On appeal, Murphy argues for the
first time that Bock violated his Fourth Amendment rights because Bock took and
retained Murphy’s personal property without a warrant. We decline to address this
argument. See In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 242 (3d Cir. 2005). To the extent
Murphy is attempting to challenge the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on his
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, we conclude that summary judgment was
properly entered in favor of Bock. In the District Court, Murphy argued that Bock had no
authority to decide who owned the property Murphy left in his office after his suspension,
and deprived Murphy of his property “without due process of law” when Bock “carried
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away numerous items of personal property” to be used by the PSP “for museum and
memorabilia collections.” Even assuming arguendo that all of the disputed items left in
Murphy’s office in fact belonged to Murphy, and that he had a property interest
implicating the due process clause, no violation of due process has occurred. Where, as
here, the complained of conduct is “random and unauthorized,”2 post-deprivation process
is all that is due. Brown v. Muhlenberg, 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001). The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provides an adequate post-deprivation process for
Murphy: the judicial remedy of a civil action for conversion. Further, the parties do not
dispute that PSP’s Internal Affairs Division has already investigated a complaint brought
by Murphy against Bock concerning the loss of or damage to Murphy’s personal property.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered
against Murphy on his due process claim.3
Finally, the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
defendant Miller. Murphy failed to demonstrate that Miller was personally involved with
the alleged taking of, and damage to, his property. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
2

We conclude that Bock’s actions were “random and unauthorized” as a matter of
law because Murphy’s opposition to the summary judgment motion failed to point to any
evidence in the record that highly placed PSP employees “condoned and ratified” the
alleged stealing and retention of his PSP memorabilia. Indeed, as stated by the District
Court, Murphy attested that he had no “hard fact evidence” to support his suspicion that
Bock was improperly motivated to take his memorabilia for use in a PSP collection.
3

Because we conclude that Murphy failed to show that Bock deprived him of a
constitutional right, we need not reach the question of whether Bock would be entitled to
qualified immunity. Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423 n. 2.
5

1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
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